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DEBATE

THE CONTRACEPTION MANDATE AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM

OPENING STATEMENT
The Hard and Easy Case of the Contraception Mandate
STEVEN D. SMITH†
There are hard cases, and then there are easy cases. The Department
of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) contraception mandate (the
Contraception Mandate) gives rise to both.
Whether the Mandate violates current free exercise doctrine presents a
hard case, in part because the doctrine, with its malleable notions of “neutral”
and “generally applicable,” is easily manipulated. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 881 (1990). I would argue that the Mandate is riddled with such
substantial exceptions that it cannot be regarded as a neutral law of general
applicability. But given doctrinal squishiness, it is hard to be confident.
By contrast, whether enforcing the Mandate against objecting religious
employers violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006), presents an easy case. Objecting
religious employers declare, evidently in good faith, that compliance with
the Mandate would require them to violate non-trivial religious commitments. See, e.g., HHS Mandate Information Central, BecketFund.org,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2013) (aggregating legal documents and news about scores of cases filed
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against the Mandate). By demanding compliance, therefore, the Mandate
substantially burdens their exercise of religion. But RFRA prohibits the
federal government from imposing such burdens unless the government has
a compelling interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means.
Although there is no metric for measuring the strength of asserted government interests, any claim that the government’s interest is compelling is
belied in this instance by the gaping exceptions the Mandate itself grants. See
26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2011 supp.) (small business exception), 42 U.S.C. § 18011
(2011 supp.) (grandfather exception). And even if the interest were compelling,
critics have identified a variety of feasible, less restrictive ways in which that
interest could be achieved. See, e.g., Ed Whelan, The HHS Contraception
Mandate vs. RFRA—“Least Restrictive Means”, Nat’l Rev. (Jan. 27, 2013),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/289534/hhs-contraceptionmandate-vs-rfra-least-restrictive-means-ed-whelan.
So then why do many competent lawyers argue for the opposite conclusion? In part the answer has to do with strength of motivations: many
people ardently want the Mandate to be enforced, even (or could it be
especially?) against religious employers. But something more complicated
and interesting is also going on. Familiar arguments supporting the Mandate are palpably unpersuasive, I think, if taken as arguments about the
meaning or application of RFRA. But those arguments are more substantial if
they are taken as tacitly addressing a different question—whether the
American commitment to special protection for religious freedom ought to be
maintained. And as it happens, that latter question is increasingly a live one
in the legal academy and in American politics.
Many people who argue that the Mandate does not violate RFRA can
be better understood as contending, wittingly or unwittingly, that religion
should not receive special, legal protection. And one reason why the
Contraception Mandate controversy seems so important, even to religious
believers (like myself) whose faith does not proscribe the use of contraceptives, is that the controversy is a contest in miniature over the fate and
future of religious freedom in America.
Consider the argument over whether the Contraception Mandate burdens the religious exercise of objecting employers. If we were merely trying
to apply RFRA in accordance with received understandings of what the free
exercise of religion means, then two simple facts ought to be dispositive.
First, Catholic and other religious employers declare that compliance with
the Mandate would force them to violate non-trivial religious commitments. Second, these declarations seem to be sincere. These two facts do not
mean, of course, that objectors will ultimately be excused from complying

Corbin Smith Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2013

The Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom

5/29/2013 2:11 PM

263

with the law; there is still the “compelling interest” qualification. But the
facts do establish that religious exercise has been substantially burdened.
In response, defenders of the Mandate could claim that the objecting
employers are insincere. But that would be a tough argument to make, and
most defenders do not rely on it. Instead they claim, in essence, that the
employers are mistaken in their belief that compliance with the Mandate
would violate their religious commitments. The bishops or university
presidents or other employers may believe that providing insurance covering contraceptives (and in many employers’ view, some abortifacients)
would involve an impermissible “cooperation with evil,” but in fact it
wouldn’t. See Robert T. Miller, The HHS Mandate, Cooperation with Evil,
and Coercion, ThePublicDiscourse.com (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/02/4817/ (discussing the doctrine of “cooperation with evil” and the Mandate). Or the employers may think that providing such insurance would unacceptably compromise their Christian
witness; but, again, they are wrong.
With the respect to the question of RFRA’s meaning and application,
however, such arguments wholly miss the mark. To be sure, Catholics (and
others) properly debate whether Catholic doctrines regarding “cooperation
with evil” forbid Catholic employers to provide insurance covering contraceptives. In like manner, people both inside and outside a religious institution may debate whether some action—such as providing insurance that
covers contraceptives—would compromise the institution’s religious
witness. These are important debates, but in applying RFRA, they should
be irrelevant. What matters, under both the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, is
whether a person—or in this case an employer—sincerely believes that
compliance with the Mandate would violate religious duties. Conversely,
arguments that a believer is mistaken in sincerely supposing that his or her
religion forbids something have long and properly been deemed incompatible with any serious respect for the free exercise of religion. Thus, when
Eddie Thomas concluded that working in the production of munitions was
forbidden by his religion, even fellow Jehovah’s Witnesses could doubt that
Thomas had correctly understood his own faith. But it was not a court’s job,
the Supreme Court observed, “to inquire whether [Thomas] or his fellow
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.”
What mattered was that Thomas sincerely believed his religion prohibited him
from working in munitions. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
No other position is compatible with a meaningful commitment to religious freedom. After all, during the centuries in which heresy and apostasy
laws were enforced, a central premise for such repression was precisely that
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those prosecuted for such transgressions were mistaken—perhaps willfully
mistaken—about their own religion: that is why these laws were enforced
only against persons deemed to be (deviant) Christians, not against Jews or
others who had never been Christian. See Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An
Historical Perspective, in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective 17,
25-26, 30-33 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds. 1996). By
contrast, modern commitments to religious freedom necessarily relinquished this premise, embracing instead the idea that persons or associations can determine for themselves what they believe, and that it is no
business of the state (or the courts) to correct their supposed errors. In
seeking to subject employers’ religious beliefs to critical examination and
rejection, and on that basis denying that their religious exercise is burdened
(even if the employers sincerely believe it is), advocates of the Mandate to
that extent revert to the medieval premise that the more modern commitment to religious freedom sought to repudiate.
Professor Caroline Corbin engages in a variant of this kind of reasoning
when she makes much of survey evidence indicating that most American
Catholics do not believe the use of artificial contraceptives is morally wrong,
and that most Catholic women actually use contraceptives. These facts may
be of interest to sociologists, for example, or church leaders (and also, of
course, to political strategists). But what exactly is their relevance for free
exercise purposes? Corbin claims, it seems, that what counts as Catholic belief
or teaching should be determined not by what church authorities teach but
rather by what a majority of Catholics believe. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The
Contraception Mandate, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 151, 156-57 (2012). So
Catholic employers are not burdened by the Mandate because Catholicism
does not actually oppose contraception; its leaders only think it does.
As an argument about the meaning and application of RFRA, this contention commits the same error just considered, and then compounds the
error. Thus, Corbin’s majoritarian argument in effect tells Catholic employers (and Catholic bishops and theologians) that they are mistaken about
their own doctrines. They believe Catholic teaching opposes contraceptives
but in fact (under Corbin’s majoritarian criterion) it doesn’t. Even Catholics who disagree with their church about contraception might easily spot
the error here: it is entirely possible for an individual Catholic to believe
that the church is mistaken on some teaching while acknowledging that this
is the church’s teaching (just as it is possible for you or me to think that the
Supreme Court got some decision badly wrong while acknowledging that
this was the Court’s decision and that the Court had the authority to make
it). But Corbin’s argument does not merely tell Catholic objectors to the
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Mandate that their beliefs about Catholic doctrine are mistaken; it attempts
to redefine the church itself from the outside. After all, the Roman Catholic
Church is and always has been a hierarchical church; its doctrines have
never been determined by simply polling the membership. Corbin’s argument, however, would in essence take authority to pronounce doctrine away
from bishops and church councils and transfer that authority to the laity.
There have, of course, been plenty of historical instances of secular rulers telling churches not only what their doctrines shall be but how those
doctrines are to be formulated and who gets to do the formulating. Corbin’s
approach resonates with that precedent. So hers is not an impossible
position to hold; it is merely incompatible with any serious respect for
religious freedom, or at least for any freedom that extends to religion’s
associational or institutional dimension.
Consider one final example. Objecting employers argue that even if the
government believes there is a compelling interest in ensuring that women
have insurance covering contraceptives, the government could achieve that
interest in ways “less restrictive” of religious exercise. Edward Whelan, The
HHS Contraception Mandate vs. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 87
Notre Dame L. Rev. 2179, 2186 (2012). One obvious and “less restrictive
means” would be for government itself to pay for the coverage instead of
forcing other people to pay for it. See id. Purporting to respond to this
point, the Issue Brief of the American Constitution Society asserts that “a
religious person’s right to an exemption does not include the right to
demand that the government pay for the exemption. The government may
do this if it chooses, but it is not constitutionally required to do so.” Frederick Mark Gedicks, Am. Constitution Soc’y for Law & Policy, With Religious
Liberty for All: A Defense of the Affordable Care Act’s Contraception
Coverage Mandate 17 (2012), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/
default/files/Gedicks_-_With_Religious_Liberty_for_All_1.pdf.
This assertion mischaracterizes the employers’ argument; it is also wholly unresponsive to that argument, and to the law as Congress enacted it.
The employers are emphatically not “demand[ing] that government pay for”
contraceptive coverage—or that anyone else pay for it. They are merely
arguing that, under RFRA, and given their religious objections, they
themselves should not be required to pay for the coverage, and to that end
are pointing out a fact that RFRA itself makes centrally relevant—that
there are “less restrictive means” of achieving the government’s objective.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006). If RFRA’s requirement could be defeated
merely by recharacterizing arguments about “less restrictive means,” as
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demands that government affirmatively act in some way, the statutory
requirement would in effect be read out of the law.
Which may be the real point. The Issue Brief’s argument resonates with
a familiar position that would refuse (or at least refuse to mandate) any
affirmative accommodation of religion: government should not persecute or
discriminate against religion; but so long as government acts for legitimate
reasons or interests, it need not go to any trouble or expense in order to
accommodate religious believers.
This is a perfectly familiar and respectable position, shared by many
scholars, judges, and government officials. But it is emphatically not the
position of RFRA, which explicitly commands affirmative accommodation of religion (subject, once again, to the “compelling interest” and
“less restrictive means” requirements). See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b).
That is why the Issue Brief’s contention is at the same time entirely off
the mark as an interpretation of RFRA but potentially appealing if taken
as a stand-alone proposition.
I have suggested that the Contraception Mandate presents an easy case
under RFRA: enforcement of the Mandate against objecting religious
employers would violate the statute. Contrary arguments typically do not
really engage the statute so much as evade or tacitly reject it. Their rhetorical force comes not from the statute, with its deliberate policy favoring
affirmative accommodation of religious exercise, but rather from a different
position that opposes any such accommodation.
As it happens, that anti-accommodationist position increasingly finds
favor with legal academics. Why should religion be singled out for special
constitutional treatment? (Or at least for special favorable treatment: those
same academics are typically happy enough with special restrictions that
prohibit government from subsidizing or endorsing religion in the way it
subsidizes and endorses other interests and views.) Douglas Laycock reports
that “scholars from all points on the spectrum now question whether there
is any modern justification for religious liberty.” Douglas Laycock, Sex,
Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 407, 423
(2011). A similar position was evident in the Obama Administration’s stance
in the recent Hosanna-Tabor case, in which the Solicitor General argued,
unsuccessfully, against giving religious institutions any special, constitutional right to select their ministerial employees on the basis of their
religious doctrines and commitments.
Whether the nation’s long standing commitment to special protection
for religious freedom should now be discarded presents a major historic
decision that is likely to become even more conspicuously contested in
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coming years. See generally Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Decline of
American Religious Freedom (forthcoming Harvard University Press 2013).
Substantial, good faith arguments can be made on both sides, I think. But
that decision is not one that courts considering challenges to the Contraception Mandate should take upon themselves.
The question for them is whether the Contraception Mandate, as
applied to objecting religious employers, violates a statute that Congress
enacted and the President signed into law. And that question, as I have
argued, presents an easy case.
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REBUTTAL
Two Easy Cases: Nonprofit and For-profit Corporate Challenges to the
Contraception Mandate
CAROLINE MALA CORBIN†
Preventive health care just got a lot more accessible. Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, health insurance plans must now offer
a range of preventive services without demanding any kind of copayment,
coinsurance, or deductible. Children can receive free vaccinations; adults
can receive free cancer screenings; and women can receive free contraception. This last requirement, often called “the Contraception Mandate,” has
led to a flurry of lawsuits by religiously affiliated employers. These
employers argue that their religion condemns the use of artificial birth
control, and that by making them include these drugs in the plans they
provide to employees, the government is forcing them to violate their
religious beliefs. These plaintiffs claim the Mandate “substantially burdens”
their “religious exercise” and violates the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA). 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). It does not.1
Before explaining why the Contraception Mandate does not impose a
substantial burden on anyone’s religious conscience, and in any event passes
strict scrutiny, I would like to make a few clarifications about the Mandate’s
scope. First, it does not apply to houses of worship or other “religious
employers” as defined by the IRS. Thus, churches, synagogues, and
mosques are completely exempt. Second, religiously affiliated nonprofits do
not have to pay for contraception or even include it in their health care
plans. Instead, their insurance provider (or, if they are self-insured, an
independent provider working with a third-party administrator) will
provide and pay for a separate policy. Finally, the plaintiffs in these cases
are not individuals, but large organizations, nonprofit and for-profit, whose
employees do not necessarily share their faith or beliefs.

†
1

Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School.
My recent essay, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLL. 151 (2012), provides
supporting citations for many of the arguments presented here. It also addresses the constitutionality of the Mandate.
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I. SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN ON RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
In order to support a claim under RFRA, an employer must establish
that the Mandate imposes a substantial religious burden. See id. According
to Professor Smith, to meet this requirement, all plaintiffs ought to have to
do is assert—sincerely—that a law substantially burdens their religious
conscience. Thus, once a Catholic institution argues, sincerely, that it is an
affront to conscience to offer contraception as part of its employees’ health
care package because it coerces the endorsement and facilitation of religiously proscribed conduct, the organization or corporation must be exempt
from the Mandate unless the Mandate passes strict scrutiny. See supra at
262. Professor Smith argues that to subject the entities’ claims to any kind
of scrutiny reveals a hidden agenda to eliminate religious accommodations
and revives the medieval practice of the government rather than the church
dictating the content of religious doctrine. See supra at 263.
The first problem with Professor’s Smith deferential approach to the
“substantial burden” inquiry is that most RFRA claims here are brought
by institutions, not individuals. When an individual says, this act burdens
my Catholic conscience, we clearly know whose conscience is at issue. But
when an institution says, this act burdens our Catholic conscience, that
clarity is lacking. Is it the institution’s conscience? If so, do institutions
even have a conscience in the way that real people do? If the argument is
that the institutional conscience embodies, represents, or stands in for the
individual consciences of its members, then it might be worth investigating members’ view of the matter.
Polls indicate that the vast majority of American Catholics neither oppose contraception nor find its use inconsistent with being “a good
Catholic.” See, e.g., CBS News Poll, Apr. 2011, The Roper Center at the
University of Connecticut (Mar. 2011), http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/
data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html In fact, almost all sexually active Catholic
women in the United States have relied on contraception at some point in
their lives, and most Catholics want the Pope to drop the Church’s official
condemnation of it. See RACHEL K. JONES & JOERG DREWEKE,
GUTTMACHER INST., COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: NEW
EVIDENCE ON RELIGION AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE, at 4 (2011) available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Religion-and-Contraceptive-Use.pdf;
USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results, USA TODAY (May 20, 2005), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2005-04-03-poll.htm.
If most American Catholics have no religious objection to contraception and
wish the Church would change its position, then it is hard to see how
making contraception available violates their conscience.
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Professor Smith sees this argument as beside the point, given that
official church doctrine condemns artificial birth control, and as highly
problematic, since it encourages the state to make pronouncements about
the internal doctrine of a church, something the state has no business doing.
But it is not beside the point: before the state grants a religious accommodation that will impose on others, it has an obligation to ensure that
people’s consciences are actually substantially burdened.
As for Professor’s Smith worry that this inquiry will necessarily require
the state to rule on theological questions beyond its institutional competence, his concern is not entirely misplaced. Indeed, the Supreme Court
abandoned the substantial burden test for Free Exercise Clause claims in
large part because the Court did not want to have to decide whether a
religious burden was slight or substantial, sincere or insincere. See, e.g.,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (wondering “what
principle of law or logic [could] be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s
assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his faith”). Professor Smith
believes this risk can be averted if the state automatically defers to church
leadership as to what constitutes a substantial burden. Here, he argues, the
Catholic Church condemns contraception, and it is official, Vatican policy
that should prevail when analyzing whether a Catholic institution has been
substantially burdened. See supra at 264-65. What this approach masks,
however, is that the state must inevitably make a decision about whose view
of Catholic conscience should control: the leadership or the membership.
Professor Smith might respond that when people join a hierarchal organization, they implicitly concede to the hierarchy’s control of such matters. But
what if the members of the organization disagree? What if, as is the case
with American Catholics today, the members of the organization concede
no such thing? See CNN & ORC, POLL 3 (2012), available at
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2012/images/02/16/rel2g.pdf. Should the state
tell them they are wrong and ignore their perspective? In short, the clash
between the majority membership and the minority leadership should at
the least raise questions about whether the Mandate imposes a substantial burden on an institution’s conscience.
It is even harder to sustain a RFRA conscience claim when the institution is a for-profit corporation that manufactures automobile lights, cabinet
doors, or HVAC equipment (as some of the current plaintiffs do). To start,
there is no indication in its legislative history or language that RFRA was
ever meant to protect for-profit corporations. In addition, for-profit corporations are not First Amendment rights holders in the same way that actual
people are. While the Supreme Court has held that corporate speech is
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protected by the Free Speech Clause in cases like Citizens United, they did
so not because corporations have a right to speak, but because audiences
have the right to hear all points of view, whatever their source. As for
corporate freedom of association and corporate free exercise, the Supreme
Court has summarily rejected the former in at least one case and never
recognized the latter. It is not surprising then that RFRA did not contemplate protecting enterprises whose primary purpose is to earn a profit.
The second problem with Professor’s Smith deferential approach to
evaluating substantial burden is that even the most remote burdens must be
accommodated if a law fails strict scrutiny. For example, if an institution
considers it “cooperation with evil” to allow its employees to use their salary
to purchase contraception, buy alcohol, or see a movie celebrating same-sex
marriage, then we—according to Professor Smith—should defer to its
sincere claims, and permit it to impose conditions on its employees’ salaries
unless laws that prohibit such conditions pass strict scrutiny. But
exemptions do not occur in a vacuum. Not only are the religious rights of
those who want an exemption implicated, but also the rights of those who
are affected by an exemption (in this case, the employees). Deciding
whether to grant a religious exemption involves a balancing act, and the
calibration is off when employees’ purchasing decisions can be considered a
substantial burden on an employer’s religious conscience.
Any burden on religious conscience created by the Contraception
Mandate is similarly attenuated. No entity is forced to use, dispense, or—
except for for-profit corporations—pay for contraception. Indeed, under
the latest compromise, religious nonprofits do not even have to cover
contraception in their health care plans; instead, their health insurance
company will offer a separate policy free of charge.
Nor is any entity being compelled to endorse contraception use. In analyzing endorsement in a case challenging a school voucher program, the
Supreme Court held that no reasonable person would conclude the government was endorsing religion even though most of the government’s voucher
money went to religious schools and might well have been used to promote
religious activities like prayer, or to provide theological education. Why?
The money ended up in religious schools’ coffers as a result of the genuine
and independent choice of private individuals. Any endorsement of religion
should be attributed to the individual who chooses a religious school, not to
the government that created the voucher program. Likewise, here, any
endorsement of contraception should be attributed to the individual employee who chooses to use it, not to the employer that provided the health
insurance plan (or access to a third party’s plan, in the case of nonprofits).
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Besides, reasonable people will understand that complying with a law
does not always equal endorsement of that law, and particularly that
providing government-mandated health care does not mean endorsement of every service offered. Because of state mandates, many Catholic
institutions already include contraception in their health care plans, yet
no reasonable person would conclude that the Vatican now supports
contraception. This is especially true given that nothing impedes the
religious entities from making their beliefs known. On the contrary,
employers are free to declare their opposition.
Still, even if a reasonable person would understand that the religious
employers are not endorsing contraception, perhaps the employers are
facilitating its use by making contraception more affordable. But arguing
that it imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise to make
something more affordable via employees’ compensation—whether it be
by a larger salary or by a more comprehensive health care package—is
simply too attenuated a claim to stand. After all, paying employees more
than minimum wage also facilitates contraception use, yet no one would
argue that religious employers should be exempt from minimum wage
laws. In short, any facilitation simply does not rise to the level of a
substantial burden on religious exercise.
II. STRICT SCRUTINY
In any case, the Contraception Mandate passes RFRA’s strict scrutiny
requirement, as it advances several compelling state interests by means that
are narrowly tailored. It is not difficult to come up with compelling reasons
why working women who do not wish to become pregnant should have
access to contraception. Nor is there a more narrowly tailored means of
increasing access to contraception for women whose religiously affiliated
employer provides health insurance.
The Mandate advances several compelling state interests. Promoting
health is a compelling state interest, and increasing access to contraception
improves women’s health and leads to healthier pregnancies since women
with planned pregnancies are more likely to seek prenatal care. Promoting
women’s bodily integrity and women’s equality are also compelling state
interests, and as legions of commentators have noted, without the ability to
control whether and when to have children, women could not participate as
equal citizens in the social, economic, and political life of the nation.
Finally, the state has a compelling interest in combatting sex discrimination
in the provision of health care benefits—the likely consequence of health
insurance plans that covers men’s basic needs but not women’s. The fact
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that there are exceptions to the law—which are available to religious and
nonreligious employers alike—does not negate the importance of women’s
well-being, personal autonomy, and equality.
Professor Smith, however, suggests that the law is not narrowly tailored
and therefore fails strict scrutiny because the government could achieve its
goals by alternate means, namely, by directly providing or subsidizing
contraception. But imagine a medical practice that refuses to see Hispanic
patients, or an employer who provides insurance covering cancer screenings
for white employees but not Asian ones. Now imagine that the medical
practice or employer argues that a law banning race discrimination in places
of public accommodation or the provision of employment benefits is not
narrowly tailored because the government could provide the services/benefits instead. Such a claim would obviously fail, and Professor
Smith’s argument should fail as well.
III. CONCLUSION
Professor Smith is no doubt correct that some who oppose exemptions
to the Mandate oppose all religious accommodations. Yet, one can support
exemptions for religious individuals and still conclude that exemptions for
large organizations challenging the Contraception Mandate are inappropriate. Indeed, for those who care about individual conscience, it is important
not to overlook the consciences of those employees who do not share the
religious beliefs of their employers. “RFRA is a shield, not a sword . . . . It
is not a means to force one’s religious practices upon others.” O’Brien v.
U.S. Dep’t Health Human Servs., No. 4:12-476 (CEJ), 2012 WL 4481208, at
*6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012). Employees who work at religiously affiliated
hospitals, schools, and charities, or at factories and stores with religious
management, may have their own moral and religious reasons for limiting
their family size. As the Supreme Court has said in regard to another social
welfare program (social security taxes), excusing religious employers
“operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.” United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 253 (1982). The same would be true here.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Free Exercise for “Large Organizations”
STEVEN D. SMITH
Readers will have noticed that the order of presentation in this brief
debate seems to have flipped: Professor Corbin’s ostensible response reads
more like an opening statement—to which my ostensible opening statement
reads like a response. The reason for this reversal, probably, is that
Professor Corbin had already published a defense of the Mandate, which I
cited and addressed in my opening statement, and her current submission
largely repeats the arguments she previously made. Thus, Professor Corbin
again claims that the Mandate does not substantially burden objecting
employers’ exercise of religion, even if they sincerely believe it requires
them to violate non-trivial religious obligations. And she again claims that
the Catholic position on contraception should be determined by survey data
reporting the opinions of church members rather than by the church’s
official doctrine as expounded by church leaders. My own statement has
already addressed these claims, and there seems little point in repeating the
arguments. So instead I will try to clarify a couple of key points and then
briefly address what seems to be a major division between us.
Professor Corbin understands me to maintain that in order to establish a
burden on religious exercise, “all plaintiffs ought to have to do is assert—
sincerely—that a law substantially burdens their religious conscience.” Supra
at 269. Let me try to be a bit more precise. It would be more accurate to say
that the law (meaning, in this instance, RFRA, as enacted by Congress and
interpreted by the courts) gets to say what counts as a burden, but that
whether some particular legal requirement in fact imposes such a burden depends
on the actual religious commitments of those subjected to the requirement.
So if I say, “It weighs on my conscience and offends my religion that our
government permits abortions [or conducts drone strikes, or closes its
borders, or whatever],” an apt answer would be, “Too bad. You may be
perfectly sincere, but that is not what it means in our law to impose a
‘burden’ on religion.” Conversely, if I report that a legal requirement to do
X would force me to violate some sincere, substantial religious commitment
that I hold, then my religious exercise is burdened, because that is the sort
of imposition the law regards as a “burden.” And if someone then contends
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that I am mistaken because I have misunderstood my own religion (which
they think does not or should not really prohibit X), they might, in some
sense, be correct—maybe my theological or scriptural understanding is
flawed—but their contention also wholly misses the point. Religious
freedom under our Constitution and laws means that no outsider—and
certainly not the government—gets to tell me what my faith is, or what my
faith does or does not prohibit.
The critic is even more off base if she contends that a legal requirement would not be burdensome as measured by some other (religious or
secular) standard or criteria. And yet, in rejecting the employers’ sincere
claims of burden, this is precisely the position taken by Professor
Corbin, and typically, by other Mandate supporters. The anomaly is
perhaps most conspicuous in Professor Corbin’s argument that because a
taxpayer would not be deemed under establishment clause doctrine to
endorse the religion of private schools that might receive public support
through a voucher program, a Christian employer is mistaken if he
sincerely claims, based on his Christian faith, that his Christian mission
and witness would be compromised by providing insurance coverage that
includes contraceptives or abortifacients. Professor Corbin’s comparison
and conclusion add up to a stark non sequitur.
All of this is not to say, of course, that religious objectors should automatically be excused from obeying a law so long as their objections are
sincere. Under RFRA, religious exercise may be burdened if this is
necessary to achieve a compelling interest that cannot be achieved
through less restrictive means. Professor Corbin dislikes this “strict
scrutiny” approach. She worries that many harmful practices might get
legal protection under this test, and she gives as an example a hypothetical employer whose religion would be burdened if employees “use their
salary to purchase contraception, buy alcohol, or see a movie celebrating
same-sex marriage.” Supra at 271.
The argument is reminiscent of Justice Scalia’s “parade of horribles” in
Employment Division v. Smith, offered to justify denying free exercise
accommodation. See 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990). But in enacting RFRA,
Congress rejected that “parade of horribles” argumentation—and for good
reason. For one thing, the horribles rarely materialize. Professor Corbin’s
hypothetical officious employer would likely have a hard time enticing
qualified people into his employ: his freedom of religion does not mean that
anybody has to work for him. And in any case, in enacting RFRA (with its
explicit “compelling interest” provision), Congress evidently determined
that the commitment to free exercise was worth the costs. In overtly
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opposing that compelling interest test, Professor Corbin obligingly corroborates the thesis of my opening statement: Mandate supporters are in reality
arguing not so much under or about RFRA, but rather against it.
Perhaps Professor Corbin’s and my most fundamental disagreement is
revealed in her questioning whether freedom of religion should extend to
institutions as well as individuals. Her reluctance to protect “institutions,”
or “large organizations,” is evident from start to finish. “[O]ne can support
exemptions for religious individuals,” she says in closing, “and yet still
conclude that exemptions for large organizations challenging the Mandate are
inappropriate.” See supra at 273 (emphasis added).
On first look, this position may be appealing. After all, isn’t it people who
have consciences, and who elicit our concern—not “large organizations”?
On closer examination, though, Professor Corbin’s position favoring
free exercise protection for “religious individuals” but not for institutions
fundamentally misconceives the real human concerns at stake and commits
a central error that religious freedom is calculated to avoid. The manifest
fact is that although some people’s religion is purely private in character,
many other peoples’ religious commitments are more communal, leading
them to form, or join, or join together in associations or institutions to
which they attribute religious significance.
Sometimes, such institutions are necessary for carrying out the religion’s
mission of service to the world: Catholic hospitals would be an example.
Sometimes the communal character of the commitment is even more
essential—almost, we might say, metaphysical. Often, religious associations
are not merely instances of individuals acting in concert in order to better
further their own individual ends (as in a buying co-op, say, or a labor
union). Rather, for these believers, the association itself—the communion—
may be at the heart of what religion is.
In this respect, a religious institution is not like a union—a musicians’
union, maybe—but more like an orchestra. There are forms of music—
symphonies or concertos, for example—that simply cannot be performed by
(as we might say) “musical individuals” acting on their own; this music can
only come into being by musicians acting in concert, as a unit. Suppose
someone were to propose that it is individual musicians—real human
beings—who matter, not “large musical organizations,” and that we should
accordingly respect and further the work of individual musicians and
composers, but not of musical “institutions,” like orchestras. The proposal
would be not merely misguided, but internally contradictory or selfdefeating, because it would prevent many musicians and composers from
making the kind of music they feel called to make.
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Professor Corbin’s preference for protecting “religious individuals” but
not religious institutions is misguided in much the same way. Viewed
merely as abstract, impersonal entities, “institutions” and “organizations”
may not elicit our concern. We care, maybe, about persons. But to deny free
exercise protection to such institutions and organizations is to frustrate the
free exercise of persons—of the very “religious individuals” about whom
Professor Corbin expresses concern.
It is true, of course, that people in religious institutions will sometimes
disagree, with their leaders and with each other. (Just as people in musical
groups—or business associations, or political parties, or pretty much any
collective human enterprise—will often disagree.) And such disagreements
can present challenges both for the associations themselves and, sometimes,
for the law. Dissenters often find that their disagreements are sufficiently
substantial that they choose to leave an institution; at least in the area of
religion, our law categorically protects their right to do so. But insofar as
such associations serve vital human purposes—purposes valuable to the
individuals who compose the associations—the existence of disagreement is
no reason to deny recognition or protection to the associations.
To be sure, many people—Professor Corbin may be one—incline toward more private or atomistic forms of religion. That is their right: our
commitment to religious freedom, manifest both in the First Amendment
and in RFRA, respects and protects that more inward-looking inclination.
But our commitment does not impose such privatistic preferences (or
permit Professor Corbin and like-minded believers to impose them) any
more than it permits the more communally-oriented believers to impose
their religious preferences. Such imposition is impermissible, from whichever direction it may come. That, surely, is what religious freedom means.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Sincere is Not Substantial and a Corporation Is Not an Orchestra
CAROLINE MALA CORBIN
According to Professor Smith, regardless of whether the religious plaintiff is an individual or an institution, courts should defer to subjective
claims of substantial burden, and any attempt to apply objective limits
implies hostility towards RFRA. Subjecting every law challenged as a
substantial burden on religion to strict scrutiny is what RFRA contemplates, he continues, and to fear the consequences is to conjure up a “parade
of horribles” that will never come to pass. See supra at 275-76. Yet courts
adopt objective legal tests all the time for reasons other than hostility. Nor
is the “parade of horribles” entirely theoretical: Indeed, one might argue
that the parade is well underway when a court can entertain the notion that
a secular, for-profit corporation has a religious “conscience” that is substantially burdened by offering comprehensive health insurance. See, e.g., Grote
v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 2013) (staying application of Mandate
to manufacturer of vehicle safety systems); Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841,
2012 WL 6757353, at *5 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (same for construction
firm); Legatus v. Sebelius, No. 12-12061, 2012 WL 5359630, at *15 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) (same for business selling outdoor power equipment);
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1295 (D. Colo. 2012) (same for
manufacturer of HVAC equipment).
I. ABSOLUTE DEFERENCE TO A SUBJECTIVE VIEW
OF RELIGIOUS BURDEN

Professor Smith argues that “[r]eligious freedom . . . means that no
outsider—and certainly not the government—gets to tell me what my
faith is, or what it does or does not prohibit.” See supra at 275. This is
quite true. If someone believes their religion condemns abortion, it is not
the government’s place to conclude otherwise. But not all perceived
burdens equal a “substantial burden” for legal purposes. That is, a court
decision that a law does not impose a “substantial burden” under RFRA
does not mean that the government is asserting superior theological
knowledge. Rather, it is a judgment that the government does not consider the burden the type that triggers strict scrutiny. Professor Smith would
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like to conflate every alleged burden with a “substantial burden” under
RFRA. But they are not necessarily the same.
As RFRA makes explicit, the law’s strict scrutiny provision is triggered
only by substantial burdens on religion, not all burdens on religion. To
simply assume a substantial burden whenever someone claims one exists
essentially reads out that requirement. Without some objective evaluation
of burden, all burdens would become eligible for accommodation. Would
this really be so bad? Consider a couple of scenarios.
Scenario number one: Imagine that Plan B is not an abortifacient. (It is
not.) Assume too that every reputable scientific study to examine Plan B’s
mechanism concludes that it works not by preventing fertilized eggs from
implanting but by immobilizing sperm and stopping ovulation in the first
instance. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, Morning-After Pills Don’t Cause Abortion,
Studies Say, NPR (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/
blogs/health/2013/02/22/172595689/morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortionstudies-say. And for the sake of argument, let’s assume there is no debate in
the scientific community about this scientific fact. See, e.g., Jamie Manson,
What an Abortifacient Is–And What It Isn’t, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER
(Feb. 20, 2012), http://ncronline.org/blogs/grace-margins/what-abortifacientand-what-it-isnt. Accordingly, Plan B is contraception and covered by the
Contraception Mandate. Now imagine that a plaintiff rejects these scientific
findings as inconclusive and maintains that Plan B is an abortifacient and
consequently believes, sincerely, that providing it to employees violates his
religious conscience. Under Professor Smith’s subjective approach—
where the government dare not question anyone’s conclusion that a law
imposes a substantial burden—the employer should be exempt from the
Mandate unless it passes strict scrutiny.
Scenario number two: Plaintiffs, owners and managers of a secular, forprofit corporation, view their company as an extension of themselves. As a
result, they sincerely believe that their company’s subsidization of contraception contravenes their religious obligations and imposes a substantial
religious burden on them as individuals. As a matter of law, however,
corporations and their owners are entirely separate legal entities. This
division is actually the point of incorporation: “Incorporation’s basic
purpose is to create a distinct legal entity with legal rights, obligations,
powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who
created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd.
v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). Consequently, for owners to argue that
requiring their corporations to pay for contraception is akin to forcing them
to pay ignores the basic, legal structure of the corporation. The corporation
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is not the alter ego of the owner; the corporation’s money is not the owner’s
money. On the contrary, owners who treat corporate funds as their own
would find themselves in a great deal of trouble. As Judge Ilana Rovner
observed, “So long as the business’s liabilities are not the [plaintiff’s]
liabilities—which is the primary and invaluable privilege conferred by the
corporate form—neither are the business’s expenditures the [plaintiffs]’ own
expenditures.” Grote, 708 F. 3d at 858 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
Should courts ignore science and accept the claim that providing Plan B
violates deeply held religious beliefs against abortion? Likewise, when a
business owner complains of a substantial burden, should courts ignore
hornbook law that a corporation is not the alter ego of its owner? In both
cases, the subjective claim of substantial religious burden may well be
sincere. In both cases, however, it ought to be rejected. In doing so the
government is not claiming to know the plaintiff’s religious beliefs better
than the plaintiff. In the first scenario, a court can assume religious opposition to abortion (even if broadly defined to include preventing implantation), but still find that, as a matter of science, Plan B it is not an
abortifacient. In the second scenario, a court would not be disputing
religious tenets but acknowledging that, as a matter of law, the corporation
is a distinct legal entity. And once it is accepted that there are objective
limits to the burdens the state must contemplate accommodating, why
shouldn’t the state decide that some burdens are, objectively speaking,
simply too attenuated for purposes of RFRA?
In fact, courts have not only the ability but the responsibility to evaluate whether the burdens caused by the Contraception Mandate are
substantial enough to merit accommodation under RFRA. After all, it is
not just the rights of employers that are at stake, but the rights of their
employees. Accommodating employers imposes costs on their employees.
As discussed in my first reply, religiously motivated restrictions on health
care implicates employees’ equality and religious liberty. The suggestion
that unhappy workers will simply seek employment elsewhere overlooks
economic reality and the huge power imbalance between employers and
employees. In any event, to require employee-protective laws to pass
strict scrutiny when the burden is slight for the employers seeking to
circumvent them is not the balance RFRA envisioned.
A. Corporations as religious institutions
So far this second reply has focused on actual people seeking the protection of RFRA, whether they are the head of a religiously affiliated organization or the owner of a company. But what if the plaintiff is not a natural
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person but an institutional “person”? Professor Smith correctly observes
that some people honor their religious commitments communally. His
metaphor of musicians playing together in an orchestra is lovely and may
well mirror people’s experience of their church, synagogue, mosque or other
voluntary religious association. See supra at 276. Nonetheless, these types of
voluntary institutions are not the institutions seeking exemptions under
RFRA. Religious organizations like churches, synagogues, and mosques are
not at issue in Contraception Mandate cases (or my discussion of them)
because they are exempt. The Mandate does not apply to them.
The institutions seeking exemption from the Contraception Mandate are
not voluntary associations but nonprofit and for-profit corporations. They are
not composed of voluntary members uniting around a common religious
vision; they are composed of employers and employees. Of course, it is
possible that some employees view themselves as participating in a collective
religious enterprise. But many of them do not. Instead, many do not share
their employer’s faith and they show up for work in order to earn a living.
They include factory workers, nurse’s aides, store managers, sales associates,
drivers, food packers, custodial staff, and administrative assistants, among
others, who depend on their paycheck and benefits to take care of themselves
and their families. For many, their job is not a religious experience but a way
to survive. Whatever may be said about voluntary members and religious
associations, it does not translate to employees and corporations.
CONCLUSION
Religious liberty is a fundamental value in our society. But it is not
the only value: Equality is as fundamental. Adding equality to the
equation means first, employers should not be able to presumptively
override the equal rights of their employees. And second, when arguing
in favor of religious liberty, it is important to ensure that the right to
religious liberty does not accrue only to the elite. Exempting for-profit
corporations from the Contraception Mandate would allow the (more
powerful) owners to force their religious views onto their (less powerful)
workers who may hold entirely different beliefs. It would be a shame if
yet another aspect of the American dream were reserved for those at the
top at the expense of everyone else.
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